2025年7月30日——憲法法庭更新

我時不時地會更新憲法法庭的近況。內容包括不限於憲法法庭的最新進展，以及台灣學者的評論。如果你喜歡這些內容，歡迎分享！

我好久沒有更新了。沒有什麼藉口，就是我的時間管理最近出了些問題。但一個重大的原因就是憲法法庭真的被癱瘓了，所以沒什麼真的重要的新發展。

本篇貼文將著重這半年來，憲法法庭的動向，尤其是針對憲法訴訟法的行為。我自己覺得是...相當有趣的。

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The TCC’s Puzzling Moves

February 10, 2025: Shutting Out the Little Guy

The TCC’s second chamber 不受理 a petition challenging the constitutionality of the CPAA amendment. The case was brought by a citizen petitioner—actually an alcohol company—arguing that the amendment shut down the court, preventing timely resolution of their previous case about compelled speech on wine labels violating freedom of speech. Their original petition had been granted certiorari back on June 2, 2023, and it’s still sitting in the docket.

The chamber dismissed the case with three reasons that are, frankly, quite unreasonable:

1. The CPAA isn’t the law applied in lower courts
2. The petitioner didn’t exhaust all legal remedies against the amendment
3. The petition was filed too late—beyond the required 6-month deadline after receiving the lower court decision

This strict application of the law is completely different from how they’ve applied it before. What this decision really conveys is that this type of case can never be brought by ordinary people. Since constitutional procedural acts are never within the jurisdiction of regular courts, it’s completely unrealistic to fulfill the requirements the TCC is demanding.

May 14, 2025: But Politicians? Sure, Come On In

Out of surprise, the TCC decided to hear the constitutionality of the CPAA on May 14, 2025. This case, different from the dismissed petition, was filed by Democratic Progressive Party legislators in parliament. The decision came after an informal meeting between justices, petitioners, and experts on April 18. Unlike oral arguments, informal meetings are a procedural device for the TCC to gather necessary information.

However, until now, the TCC hasn’t done anything after deciding to hear the case.

Why Politicizes the Court?

In my opinion, the TCC’s decision-making is quite unwise if they really want to hear this case. By hearing it as a conflict between political parties instead of on the first occasion with the citizen petition, the TCC has stepped into the deep waters of political conflict. Neither a constitutional nor unconstitutional decision can help the court escape criticism—they’ll be called a party-manipulated puppet either way.

The choice the court needs to make isn’t just about legal acquiescence or self-protection. They need to consider public criticism too.

Similar to other apex courts worldwide, “the judiciary can impose constitutional constraints on powerful political actors only if these actors support the judiciary—either because the public does or the politicians themselves do (Bradley & Siegel, 2025).” The current parliamentary majority is obviously not allied with the TCC, and the public, after the failed recall efforts, isn’t either. This is why I think intervening in this case through political conflict is unwise. No matter what the legal arguments are, it looks like the TCC need to chose a camp to join. It’s bad for judicial trust and even worse for restoring the TCC’s authority.

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Recent Political Drama

July 25: Nobody Gets Confirmed

Parliament exercised their confirmation power on new TCC justice candidates nominated by President Lai Ching-te in the second round. None was confirmed as the first time. The KMT and TPP alliance didn’t confirm any justice candidates, but surprisingly, the DPP didn’t confirm all the justices either. Two candidates—law professors Chan Chen-jung and Chen Tzu-yang—received only 26 out of 56 DPP votes.

While there’s no official explanation, my reading is that most legislators still see justice candidates as their potential promoters in the court. For example, these two professors revealed more reserved views toward policies promoted by the KMT and TPP alliance.

July 26: The Great Recall That Wasn’t

The citizen-initiated, DPP-supported “great recall” failed to unseat any legislators in parliament. If I remember correctly, this recall was initiated by the Economic Democracy Union, an NGO established during the 2014 Sunflower Student Movement. They came up with this political strategy after several legal strategies failed—like requiring the president to unpublish the law or dissolve parliament.

The DPP didn’t initiate the great recall but joined the movement after most recall requirements were fulfilled. Within the recall movement, it was framed as the only way to secure Taiwan by unseating pro-China legislators. However, this didn’t persuade most voters.